

Introduction

MPRI 2–6: Abstract Interpretation,
application to verification and static analysis

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course i, 2012–2013

Ariane 5, Flight 501



Maiden flight of the Ariane 5 Launcher, 4 June 1996.

Ariane 5, Flight 501



40s after launch...

Ariane 5, Flight 501

- **Cause:** software error¹

- arithmetic overflow in unprotected data conversion from 64-bit float to 16-bit integer types²

```
P_M_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BH) :=  
    UC_16S_EN_16NS (TDB.T_ENTIER_16S  
        ((1.0/C_M_LSB_BH) * G_M_INFO_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BH)));
```

- software exception not caught \implies computer switched off
- all backup computers run the same software
all computers switched off, no guidance
 \implies rocket self-destructs

- **Cost:** estimated at more than 370 000 000 US\$³

¹ J.-L. Lions et al., Ariane 501 Inquiry Board report.

² J.-J. Levy. Un petit bogue, un grand boum. Séminaire du Département d'informatique de l'ENS, 2010.

³ M. Dowson. "The Ariane 5 Software Failure". Software Engineering Notes 22 (2): 84, March 1997.

How can we avoid such failures?

- Choose a safe programming language.
C (low level) / Ada, Java (high level)
- Carefully design the software.
many software development methods exist
- Program well.
is it art or science?
- Test the software extensively.

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yet, Ariane 5 software is written in Ada
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yet, critical embedded software follow strict development processes
- Program well.
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- Test the software extensively.
yet, the erroneous code was well tested... on Ariane 4!

⇒ **not sufficient!**

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yet, the erroneous code was well tested... on Ariane 4!

⇒ **not sufficient!**

We should use **formal methods**.

provide rigorous, mathematical insurance

Invariants and programs

```
assume X in [0,1000];
```

```
I := 0;
```

```
while I < X do
```

```
    I := I + 2;
```

```
assert I in [0,???
```

⁴R. W. Floyd. "Assigning meanings to programs". In Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. Symposia in Applied Mathematics, vol. 19, pp. 19–31, 1967.

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Invariants and programs

```
assume X in [0,1000];  
{X ∈ [0,1000]}  
I := 0;  
{X ∈ [0,1000], I = 0}  
while I < X do  
  {X ∈ [0,1000], I ∈ [0,998]}  
  I := I + 2;  
  {X ∈ [0,1000], I ∈ [2,1000]}  
{X ∈ [0,1000], I ∈ [0,1000]}  
assert I in [0,1000]
```



Robert Floyd⁴

invariant: property true of all the executions of the program

⁴R. W. Floyd. "Assigning meanings to programs". In Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. Symposia in Applied Mathematics, vol. 19, pp. 19–31, 1967.

Invariants and programs

```
assume X in [0,1000];  
{X ∈ [0,1000]}  
I := 0;  
{X ∈ [0,1000], I = 0}  
while I < X do  
  {X ∈ [0,1000], I ∈ {0, 2, ..., 996, 998}}  
  I := I + 2;  
  {X ∈ [0,1000], I ∈ {2, 4, ..., 998, 1000}}  
{X ∈ [0,1000], I ∈ {0, 2, ..., 998, 1000}}  
assert I in [0,1000]
```



Robert Floyd⁴

inductive invariant: invariant that can be proved to hold by induction on loop iterates

⁴R. W. Floyd. "Assigning meanings to programs". In Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. Symposia in Applied Mathematics, vol. 19, pp. 19–31, 1967.

$$\frac{}{\{P[e/X]\} X := e \{P\}} \quad \frac{\{P\} C_1 \{R\} \quad \{R\} C_2 \{Q\}}{\{P\} C_1; C_2 \{Q\}}$$

$$\frac{\{P \& b\} C \{P\}}{\{P\} \text{while } b \text{ do } C \{P \& \neg b\}}$$

...



Tony Hoare⁵

- sound logic to prove program properties, (rel.) complete
- proofs can be checked automatically
(e.g., using proof assistants: Coq, PVS, Isabelle, HOL, etc.)

⁵C. A. R. Hoare. "An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming". *Commun. ACM* 12(10): 576-580 (1969).

⁶How Many Lines of Code in Windows?". *Knowing.NET*. December 6, 2005.

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Tony Hoare⁵

- sound logic to prove program properties, (rel.) complete
- proofs can be checked automatically
(e.g., using proof assistants: Coq, PVS, Isabelle, HOL, etc.)
- requires annotations
but **manual annotation is not practical for large programs!**
(e.g., Windows XP: 45 Mlines⁶)

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Computers, programs, data

$$O(P, D) \in \{\text{yes}, \text{no}, \perp\}$$



O



P



D

The computer *O* runs the program *P* on the data *D* and answers (*yes*, *no*)... or does not answer (\perp).

Computers, programs, data

$$O(P, D) \in \{\text{yes}, \text{no}, \perp\}$$



O



P



P'

Note that programs are also a kind of data!

They can be fed to other programs. (e.g., to compilers)

Static analyzer A .

Given a program P :

- $O(A, P) = \text{yes} \iff \forall D, O(P, D)$ is safe
- $O(A, P) \neq \perp$ (the static analysis always terminates)

Static analysis

Static analyzer A .

Given a program P :

- $O(A, P) = \text{yes} \iff \forall D, O(P, D) \text{ is safe}$
- $O(A, P) \neq \perp$ (the static analysis always terminates)

$\implies P$ is proved safe even before it is run!



Fundamental undecidability

There **cannot exist** a static analyzer A proving the termination of every terminating program P .

Proof sketch:

$$A(P \cdot D) : O(A, P \cdot D) = \begin{cases} \text{yes if } O(P, D) \neq \perp \\ \text{no otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$A'(X) : \text{while } A(X \cdot X) \text{ do } \textit{nothing}; \textit{no}$

do we have $O(A', A') = \perp$ or $\neq \perp$? neither!
 $\implies A$ cannot exist



Alan Turing⁷

⁷ A. M. Turing. "Computability and definability". The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 2, pp. 153–163, (1937).

⁸ H. G. Rice. "Classes of Recursively Enumerable Sets and Their Decision Problems." Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 74, 358–366, 1953.

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Alan Turing⁷

All “interesting” properties are **undecidable!**⁸



⁷ A. M. Turing. “Computability and definability”. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 2, pp. 153–163, (1937).

⁸ H. G. Rice. “Classes of Recursively Enumerable Sets and Their Decision Problems.” Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 74, 358–366, 1953.

Approximate static analysis

An **approximate** static analyzer A always answers in finite time ($\neq \perp$):

- either **yes**: the program P is definitely safe (soundness)
- either **no**: I don't know (incompleteness)

Sufficient to prove the safety of (some) programs.
Fails on infinitely many programs. . .

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
\implies We should **adapt** the analyzer A to

- a class of programs to verify, and
- a class of safety properties to check.

Abstract interpretation



Patrick Cousot⁹



General theory of the approximation and comparison of program semantics:

- unifies many semantics
- allows the definition of static analyses that are correct by construction

⁹ P. Cousot. "Méthodes itératives de construction et d'approximation de points fixes d'opérateurs monotones sur un treillis, analyse sémantique des programmes." Thèse És Sciences Mathématiques, 1978.

Abstract interpretation

(\mathcal{S}_0)

assume X in [0,1000];

(\mathcal{S}_1)

I := 0;

(\mathcal{S}_2)

while (\mathcal{S}_3) I < X do

(\mathcal{S}_4)

I := I + 2;

(\mathcal{S}_5)

(\mathcal{S}_6)

program

Abstract interpretation

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(\mathcal{S}_5)

(\mathcal{S}_6)

program

$\mathcal{S}_i \in \mathcal{D} = \mathcal{P}(\{I, X\} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z})$

$\mathcal{S}_0 = \{(i, x) \mid i, x \in \mathbb{Z}\} = \top$

$\mathcal{S}_1 = \{(i, x) \in \mathcal{S}_0 \mid x \in [0, 1000]\} = F_1(\mathcal{S}_0)$

$\mathcal{S}_2 = \{(0, x) \mid \exists i, (i, x) \in \mathcal{S}_1\} = F_2(\mathcal{S}_1)$

$\mathcal{S}_3 = \mathcal{S}_2 \cup \mathcal{S}_5$

$\mathcal{S}_4 = \{(i, x) \in \mathcal{S}_3 \mid i < x\} = F_4(\mathcal{S}_3)$

$\mathcal{S}_5 = \{(i + 2, x) \mid (i, x) \in \mathcal{S}_4\} = F_5(\mathcal{S}_4)$

$\mathcal{S}_6 = \{(i, x) \in \mathcal{S}_3 \mid i \geq x\} = F_6(\mathcal{S}_3)$

semantics

Concrete semantics $\mathcal{S}_i \in \mathcal{D} = \mathcal{P}(\{I, X\} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z})$:

- smallest solution of a system of equations
- strongest invariant (and an inductive invariant)
- not computable in general

Abstract interpretation

(S_0)

assume X in [0,1000];

(S_1)

I := 0;

(S_2)

while (S_3) I < X do

(S_4)

I := I + 2;

(S_5)

(S_6)

program

$S_i^\# \in \mathcal{D}^\#$

$S_0^\# = \top^\#$

$S_1^\# = F_1^\#(S_0^\#)$

$S_2^\# = F_2^\#(S_1^\#)$

$S_3^\# = S_2^\# \cup^\# S_5^\#$

$S_4^\# = F_4^\#(S_3^\#)$

$S_5^\# = F_5^\#(S_4^\#)$


$S_6^\# = F_6^\#(S_3^\#)$

semantics

Abstract semantics $S_i^\# \in \mathcal{D}^\#$:

- $\mathcal{D}^\#$ subset of properties of interest
(with a machine representation)
- $F_i^\# : \mathcal{D}^\# \rightarrow \mathcal{D}^\#$ over-approximates the effect of $F : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}$ in $\mathcal{D}^\#$
(with effective algorithms)


Numeric abstract domain examples



concrete sets \mathcal{D} :


$\{(0, 3), (5.5, 0), (12, 7), \dots\}$

Numeric abstract domain examples



concrete sets \mathcal{D} : $\{(0, 3), (5.5, 0), (12, 7), \dots\}$
abstract polyhedra \mathcal{D}_p^\sharp : $6X + 11Y \geq 33 \wedge \dots$

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
abstract polyhedra $\mathcal{D}_p^\#$:

$$6X + 11Y \geq 33 \wedge \dots$$

abstract octagons $\mathcal{D}_o^\#$:

$$X + Y \geq 3 \wedge Y \geq 0 \wedge \dots$$

Numeric abstract domain examples



concrete sets \mathcal{D} :

abstract polyhedra $\mathcal{D}_p^\#$:

abstract octagons $\mathcal{D}_o^\#$:

abstract intervals $\mathcal{D}_i^\#$:


$$\{(0, 3), (5.5, 0), (12, 7), \dots\}$$

$$6X + 11Y \geq 33 \wedge \dots$$

$$X + Y \geq 3 \wedge Y \geq 0 \wedge \dots$$

$$X \in [0, 12] \wedge Y \in [0, 8]$$


Numeric abstract domain examples



concrete sets \mathcal{D} :	$\{(0, 3), (5.5, 0), (12, 7), \dots\}$	not computable
abstract polyhedra $\mathcal{D}_p^\#$:	$6X + 11Y \geq 33 \wedge \dots$	exponential cost
abstract octagons $\mathcal{D}_o^\#$:	$X + Y \geq 3 \wedge Y \geq 0 \wedge \dots$	cubic cost
abstract intervals $\mathcal{D}_i^\#$:	$X \in [0, 12] \wedge Y \in [0, 8]$	linear cost


Trade-off between cost and expressiveness / precision

Correctness proof and false alarms



The program is **correct** ($\text{blue} \cap \text{red} = \emptyset$).


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The polyhedra domain **can prove the correctness** ($\text{cyan} \cap \text{red} = \emptyset$).

Correctness proof and false alarms




The program is **correct** ($\text{blue} \cap \text{red} = \emptyset$).

The polyhedra domain **can prove the correctness** ($\text{cyan} \cap \text{red} = \emptyset$).

The interval domain **cannot** ($\text{green} \cap \text{red} \neq \emptyset$, false alarm).

Numeric abstract domain examples (cont.)



abstract semantics F^\sharp in the interval domain \mathcal{D}_i^\sharp

- $\mathbf{I} := \mathbf{I} + 2$: $(\mathbf{I} \in [\ell, h]) \mapsto (\mathbf{I} \in [\ell + 2, h + 2])$
- \mathbf{U}^\sharp : $(\mathbf{I} \in [\ell_1, h_1]) \cup^\sharp (\mathbf{I} \in [\ell_2, h_2])$
 $= (\mathbf{I} \in [\min(\ell_1, \ell_2), \max(h_1, h_2)])$
- ...

$$(\mathcal{D}, \subseteq) \begin{matrix} \xleftarrow{\gamma} \\ \xrightarrow{\alpha} \end{matrix} (\mathcal{D}^\#, \subseteq^\#)$$

$$\alpha(X) \subseteq^\# Y^\# \iff X \subseteq \gamma(Y^\#)$$



Évariste Galois

Use:

- $\alpha(X)$ is the best abstraction of X in $\mathcal{D}^\#$
- $F^\# = \alpha \circ F \circ \gamma$ is the best abstraction of F in $\mathcal{D}^\# \rightarrow \mathcal{D}^\#$

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Example: in the interval domain $\mathcal{D}_i^\#$

- $[l_1, h_1] \subseteq_i^\# [l_2, h_2] \iff l_1 \geq l_2 \wedge h_1 \leq h_2$
- $\gamma_i([l, h]) = \{x \in \mathbb{Z} \mid l \leq x \leq h\}$
- $\alpha_i(X) = [\min X, \max X]$

Resolution by iteration and extrapolation

Challenge: the equation system is recursive: $\vec{S}^\# = \vec{F}^\#(\vec{S}^\#)$.

Solution: resolution by iteration: $\vec{S}^{\#0} = \emptyset^\#, \vec{S}^{\#i+1} = \vec{F}^\#(\vec{S}^{\#i})$.

e.g., $\mathcal{S}_3^\# : I \in \emptyset, I = 0, I \in [0, 2], I \in [0, 4], \dots, I \in [0, 1000]$

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Challenge: infinite or very long sequence of iterates in $\mathcal{D}^\#$

Solution: extrapolation operator ∇

e.g., $[0, 2] \nabla [0, 4] = [0, +\infty[$

- remove unstable bounds and constraints
- ensures the convergence in finite time
- **inductive** reasoning (through generalisation)

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e.g., \mathcal{S}_3^\sharp : $I \in \emptyset$, $I = 0$, $I \in [0, 2]$, $I \in [0, 4]$, \dots , $I \in [0, 1000]$

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- **inductive** reasoning (through generalisation)

\implies effective solving method \longrightarrow static analyzer!

The Astrée static analyzer

The screenshot displays the Astrée static analyzer interface. The main window is titled "Astrée" and contains a menu bar (Project, Analysis, Editors, Edit, Help) and a toolbar with various icons. The interface is divided into several panes:

- Left Pane:** A sidebar with a tree view showing "Example 1: scenarios" and "Files" (scenarios.c).
- Top Left Pane:** "Local settings" and "Analysis options" (Analysis start (main), Parallelization, ABI, Global directives, General, Domains, Output).
- Top Middle Pane:** "Analyzed file: /invalid/path/scenarios.c" showing source code from line 24 to 49. The code includes a pointer assignment, an if-statement with an uninitialized pointer, and an assertion.
- Top Right Pane:** "Original source: C:/Pr...ples/scenarios/src/scenarios.c" showing the original source code from line 37 to 61, with annotations like "/* Type cast causing overflow." and "/* Precise handling of pointer arithmetic".
- Bottom Left Pane:** A summary of analysis results: Errors: 2 (2), Alarms: 5 (5), Warnings: 1, Coverage: 100%, Duration: 30s. A traffic light icon shows a red light.
- Bottom Middle Pane:** A table of results:

Errors	Alarms	Not analyzed	Coverage	Files
2 (2)	5 (5)	0	100%	scenarios.c

 - Alarms:
 - Overflow in conversion
 - Out-of-bound array access
 - Possible overflow upon dereference
 - Possible overflow upon dereference
 - Assertion failure
 - Errors:
 - Define runtime error during assignment in this context. Analysis stopped for this context.
 - Define runtime error during assignment in this context. Analysis stopped for this context.
- Bottom Right Pane:** A "File view" dropdown menu.

At the bottom of the window, it says "Connected to localhost:1059 as anonymous@ABSINT-VMWARE".

The Astrée static analyzer

Analyseur statique de programmes temps-réels embarqués (static analyzer for real-time embedded software)

- developed at **ENS** (since 2001)
 - | B. Blanchet, P. Cousot, R. Cousot, J. Feret,
| L. Mauborgne, D. Monniaux, A. Miné, X. Rival
- industrialized and made commercially available by **AbsInt**
(since 2009)



Astrée

www.astree.ens.fr



AbsInt

www.absint.com

The Astrée static analyzer

Specialized:

- for the analysis of **run-time errors**
(arithmetic overflows, array overflows, divisions by 0, etc.)
- on embedded critical **C** software
(no dynamic memory allocation, no recursivity)
- in particular on **control / command** software
(reactive programs, intensive floating-point computations)
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(analysis does not miss any error and tries to minimise false alarms)

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Approximately **40 abstract domains** are used **at the same time**:

- numeric domains (intervals, octagons, ellipsoids, etc.)
- boolean domains
- domains expressing properties on the history of computations

Astrée applications (at ENS)



Airbus A340-300 (2003)



Airbus A380 (2004)



(model of) ESA ATV (2008)

- size: from 70 000 to 860 000 lines of C
- analysis time: from 45mn to \simeq 40h
- alarm(s): 0 (proof of absence of run-time error)

Other applications of abstract interpretation

- Analysis of dynamic memory data-structures (*shape analysis*).
- Analysis of parallel, distributed, and multi-thread programs.
- Analysis of probabilistic programs.
- Analysis of biological systems.
- Security analysis (*information flow*).
- Termination analysis.
- Cost analysis.
- Analyses to enable compiler optimisations.
- ...