
Static Analysis of Neural Networks

MPRI 2-6: Abstract Interpretation, Application to Verification and Static Analysis



Caterina Urban


18 December 2020

Year 2020-2021

Availability of vast amounts of **Data**




Recent advances in Machine Learning



Machine Learning Revolution

Computer software able to efficiently and **autonomously perform tasks** that are difficult or even *impossible* to design using explicit programming



Examples: object recognition, image classification, speech recognition, etc.

Course 10

Static Analysis of Neural Networks

ML in Safety-Critical Applications

Enables new functions that could not be envisioned before



Self-Driving Cars



Image-Based Taxiing, Takeoff, Landing


Aircraft Voice Control

ML in Safety-Critical Applications

Approximates complex systems and automates decision-making



Diagnosis and Drug Discovery



Abstract—One approach to designing decision making logic for

an aircraft collision avoidance system frames the problem as a

Markov decision process and optimizes the system using dynamic

programming. The resulting collision avoidance strategy can be

represented as a numeric table. This methodology has been used

AIRBUS A380

.....

floating point storage. A simple technique to reduce the size of the score table is to downsample the table after dynamic programming. To minimize the degradation in decision quality, states are removed in areas where the variation between values in the table are smooth. The downsampling reduces the size of the table by a factor of 180 from that produced by dynamic programming. For the rest of this paper, the downsampled in the development of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) family of collision avoidance systems for manned and ACAS Xu horizontal table is referred to as the baseline, unmanned aircraft, but the high dimensionality of the state space ables. To improve storage efficiency, a deep ariginal table.

the current table requires over

Course 10

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Static Analysis of Neural Networks

Aircraft Collision Avoidance

Caterina Urban

ML in Safety-Critical Applications

STAT+2 IBM's Watson supercomputer recommended 'unsafe and incorrect' cancer treatments, internal documents show

By <u>Casey Ross</u>³ @caseymross⁴ and Ike Swetlitz

July 25, 2018

A self-driving Uber ran a red light last December, contrary to company claims

Internal documents reveal that the car was at fault

By Andrew Liptak | @AndrewLiptak | Feb 25, 2017, 11:08am EST

Feds Say Self-Driving Uber SUV Did Not Recognize Jaywalking Pedestrian In Fatal Crash


Richard Gonzales November 7, 201910:57 PM ET



Neural Networks


Neural Networks

Feed-Forward Fully-Connected Neural Networks with ReLU Activation Functions



Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU)

Feed-Forward Fully-Connected ReLU Networks as Programs




x00 = input()x01 = input()x10 = -0.31 * x00 + 0.99 * x01 + (-0.63)x11 = -1.25 * x00 + (-0.64) * x01 + 1.88


return '

x10 = 0 if x10 < 0 else x10x11 = 0 if x11 < 0 else x11 x20 = 0.40 * x10 + 1.21 * x11 + 0.00x21 = **0.64** * x10 + **0.69** * x11 + (-**0.39**) $x_{20} = 0$ if $x_{20} < 0$ else x_{20} x21 = 0 if x21 < 0 else x21 x30 = 0.26 * x20 + 0.33 * x21 + 0.45X31 = **1.42** * x20 + **0.40** * x21 + (-**0.45**) if x31 < 30 else

Maximal Trace Semantics




Neural Network Verification



Stability

Goal G3 in [Kurd03]






Fairness


Stability

Goal G3 in [Kurd03]


Safety

Goal G4 in [Kurd03]










Static Analysis of Neural Networks

Local Stability

The classification is unaffected by small input perturbations



Local Stability

Distance-Based Perturbations

 $P_{\delta,\epsilon}(\mathbf{x}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \mathbf{x}' \in \mathscr{R}^{|L_0|} \mid \delta(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}') \le \epsilon \}$

Example (L_{∞} distance): $P_{\infty,\epsilon}(\mathbf{x}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\mathbf{x}' \in \mathscr{R}^{|L_0|} \mid \max_i |\mathbf{x}_i - \mathbf{x}'_i| \le \epsilon\}$

$\mathscr{R}^{\delta,\epsilon}_{\mathbf{x}} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \{ \llbracket M \rrbracket \in \mathscr{P}(\Sigma^*) \mid \mathsf{STABLE}^{\delta,\epsilon}_{\mathbf{x}}(\llbracket M \rrbracket) \}$


 $\mathscr{R}_{\mathbf{x}}^{\delta,\epsilon}$ is the set of all neural networks M (or, rather, their semantics [[M]]) that are **stable** in the neighborhood $P_{\delta,\epsilon}(\mathbf{x})$ of a given input \mathbf{x}

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{STABLE}_{\mathbf{x}}^{\delta,\epsilon}(\llbracket M \rrbracket) \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \forall t \in \llbracket M \rrbracket : (\exists t' \in \llbracket M \rrbracket : \forall 0 \le i \le |L_0| : t'_0(x_{0,i}) = \mathbf{x}_i) \\ & \wedge (\exists \mathbf{x}' \in P_{\delta,\epsilon}(\mathbf{x}) : \forall 0 \le i \le |L_0| : t_0(x_{0,i}) = \mathbf{x}'_i) \\ & \Rightarrow \max_j t_{\omega}(x_{N,j}) = \max_j t'_{\omega}(x_{N,j}) \end{aligned}$$




Numerical Abstractions

Forward Analysis




 proceed forwards from an abstraction of all possible perturbations










 $P(\langle 0.5, 0.75 \rangle) \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \{ \mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{R} \mid 0 \leq \mathbf{x}_0 \leq 1 \land 0 \leq \mathbf{x}_1 \leq 1 \}$

 $x_{i,j} \mapsto [a,b]$ $a,b \in \mathcal{R}$



with Symbolic Constant Propagation [Li19]


$$x_{i,j} \mapsto \begin{cases} \sum_{k=0}^{i-1} \mathbf{c}_k \cdot \mathbf{x}_k + \mathbf{c} \quad \mathbf{c}_k, \mathbf{c} \in \mathscr{R}^{|L_k|} \\ [a, b] \quad a, b \in \mathscr{R} \end{cases}$$

$$(\sum_{i=1}^{i-1} \mathbf{c}_k \cdot \mathbf{x}_k + \mathbf{c} \quad 0 \le a$$


$$(\sum_{i=1}^{i-1} \mathbf{c}_k \cdot \mathbf{x}_k + \mathbf{c} \quad 0 \le a$$


$$x_{i,j} \mapsto \begin{cases} \sum_{k=0}^{i-1} \mathbf{c}_k \cdot \mathbf{x}_k + \mathbf{c} & \text{ReLU} \\ [a, b] & & \\ &$$


with Symbolic Constant Propagation [Li19]





with Symbolic Constant Propagation [Li19]


















$$\begin{aligned} x_{00} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00}, x_{00}] \\ [\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}] \end{cases} & x_{01} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{01}, x_{01}] \\ [\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}] \end{cases} \\ x_{10} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00} + x_{01} + 4, x_{00} + x_{01} + 4] \\ [\mathbf{4}, \mathbf{6}] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3, 0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3] \\ [\mathbf{3}, \mathbf{4}] \end{cases} \\ x_{20} \mapsto \begin{cases} [2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}, 2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}] \\ [\mathbf{17}, \mathbf{24}] \end{cases} & x_{21} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11}, x_{10} - x_{11}] \\ [\mathbf{1}, \mathbf{2}] \end{cases} \\ x_{30} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{20} - x_{21} - 14, x_{20} - x_{21} - 14] \\ [\mathbf{2}, \mathbf{8}] \end{cases} & x_{31} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0, 0.5 \cdot (0.5 \cdot x_{20} - 1.5 \cdot x_{21} - 8) + 0.5] \\ [\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}] \end{cases} \\ x_{40} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0.5 \cdot x_{30} - 2 \cdot x_{31} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{30} - 2 \cdot x_{31} + 1] \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_{00} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00}, x_{00}] \\ [\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}] \end{cases} & x_{01} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{01}, x_{01}] \\ [\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}] \end{cases} \\ x_{10} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00} + x_{01} + 4, x_{00} + x_{01} + 4] \\ [\mathbf{4}, \mathbf{6}] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3, 0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3] \\ [\mathbf{3}, \mathbf{4}] \end{cases} \\ x_{20} \mapsto \begin{cases} [2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}, 2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}] \\ [\mathbf{17}, \mathbf{24}] \end{cases} & x_{21} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11}, x_{10} - x_{11}] \\ [\mathbf{1}, \mathbf{2}] \end{cases} \\ x_{30} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{20} - x_{21} - 14, x_{20} - x_{21} - 14] \\ [\mathbf{2}, \mathbf{8}] \end{cases} & x_{31} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0, 0.5 \cdot (0.5 \cdot x_{20} - 1.5 \cdot x_{21} - \mathbf{8}) + 0.5] \\ [\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}] \end{cases} \\ x_{40} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{21} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{20} - 0.5 \cdot x_{21} - \mathbf{6}] \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_{00} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00}, x_{00}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} & x_{01} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{01}, x_{01}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} & x_{01} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{01}, x_{01}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} & x_{10} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00} + x_{01} + 4, x_{00} + x_{01} + 4] \\ [4, 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3, 0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3] \\ [3, 4] \end{cases} & x_{20} \mapsto \begin{cases} [2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}, 2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}] \\ [17, 24] \end{cases} & x_{21} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11}, x_{10} - x_{11}] \\ [4, 2] \end{cases} & x_{30} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{20} - x_{21} - 14, x_{20} - x_{21} - 14] \\ [2, 8] \end{cases} & x_{31} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0, 0.5 \cdot (0.5 \cdot x_{20} - 1.5 \cdot x_{21} - 8) + 0.5] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} & x_{40} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{21} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{20} - 0.5 \cdot x_{21} - 6] \\ \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{11} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{11} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{11} - x_{11} + 1, 0 + 2 \cdot x_{11} + 2 \cdot x_{11$$

$$\begin{split} x_{00} \mapsto & \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} x_{00}, x_{00} \end{bmatrix} \\ \begin{bmatrix} 0, 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ x_{10} \mapsto \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} x_{00} + x_{01} + 4, x_{00} + x_{01} + 4 \end{bmatrix} \\ \begin{bmatrix} x_{10} + x_{01} + 4, x_{00} + x_{01} + 4 \end{bmatrix} \\ x_{11} \mapsto \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} 0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3, 0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3 \end{bmatrix} \\ x_{20} \mapsto \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} 12 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}, 2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11} \end{bmatrix} \\ x_{21} \mapsto \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} x_{10} - x_{11}, x_{10} - x_{11} \end{bmatrix} \\ \begin{bmatrix} 17, 24 \end{bmatrix} \\ x_{30} \mapsto \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} x_{20} + x_{21} - 14, x_{20} - x_{21} - 14 \end{bmatrix} \\ x_{31} \mapsto \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} 0, 0.5 \cdot x_{00} - 1.5 \cdot x_{21} - 8 \right) + 0.5 \end{bmatrix} \\ \begin{bmatrix} 0, 0.5 \cdot x_{00} - 1.5 \cdot x_{21} - 8 \right) + 0.5 \end{bmatrix} \\ x_{40} \mapsto \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} x_{21} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{20} - 0.5 \cdot x_{21} - 6 \end{bmatrix} \\ \mapsto \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6 \end{bmatrix} \\ \mapsto \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} 0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 2, 1.5 \cdot x_{00} + 1.5 \cdot x_{11} + 2 \end{bmatrix} \right\} \end{split}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_{00} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00}, x_{00}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} & x_{01} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{01}, x_{01}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} \\ x_{10} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00} + x_{01} + 4, x_{00} + x_{01} + 4] \\ [4, 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3, 0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3] \\ [3, 4] \end{cases} \\ x_{20} \mapsto \begin{cases} [2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}, 2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}] \\ [17, 24] \end{cases} & x_{21} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11}, x_{10} - x_{11}] \\ [1, 2] \end{cases} \\ x_{30} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{20} - x_{21} - 14, x_{20} - x_{21} - 14] \\ [2, 8] \end{cases} & x_{31} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0, 0.5 \cdot (0.5 \cdot x_{20} - 1.5 \cdot x_{21} - 8) + 0.5] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} \\ x_{40} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{30} - 2 \cdot x_{31} + 1] \\ \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{10} + 2 \cdot x_{11} - 6] \\ \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11} + 1, 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 2, 1.5 \cdot x_{00} + 1.5 \cdot x_{11} + 2] \\ [2, 5] \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$




$$\begin{aligned} x_{00} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00}, x_{00}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} & x_{01} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{01}, x_{01}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} \\ x_{10} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00} + x_{01} + 4, x_{00} + x_{01} + 4] \\ [4, 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3, 0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3] \\ [3, 4] \end{cases} \\ x_{20} \mapsto \begin{cases} [2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}, 2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}] \\ [17, 24] \end{cases} & x_{21} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11}, x_{10} - x_{11}] \\ [1, 2] \end{cases} \\ x_{30} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{20} - x_{21} - 14, x_{20} - x_{21} - 14] \\ [2, 8] \end{cases} & x_{31} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0, 0.5 \cdot (0.5 \cdot x_{20} - 1.5 \cdot x_{21} - 8) + 0.5] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_{00} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00}, x_{00}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} & x_{01} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{01}, x_{01}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} \\ x_{10} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00} + x_{01} + 4, x_{00} + x_{01} + 4] \\ [4, 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3, 0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3] \\ [3, 4] \end{cases} \\ x_{20} \mapsto \begin{cases} [2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}, 2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}] \\ [17, 24] \end{cases} & x_{21} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11}, x_{10} - x_{11}] \\ [1, 2] \end{cases} \\ x_{30} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{20} - x_{21} - 14, x_{20} - x_{21} - 14] \\ [2, 8] \end{cases} & x_{31} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0, 0.5 \cdot (0.5 \cdot x_{20} - 1.5 \cdot x_{21} - 8) + 0.5] \\ [0, -1] \end{cases} \\ \mapsto \begin{cases} [0, 0.25 \cdot x_{20} - 0.75 \cdot x_{21} - 3.5] \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_{00} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00}, x_{00}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} & x_{01} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{01}, x_{01}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} & x_{01} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{01}, x_{01}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00} + x_{01} + 4, x_{00} + x_{01} + 4] \\ [4, 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3, 0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3] \\ [3, 4] \end{cases} & x_{20} \mapsto \begin{cases} [2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}, 2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}] \\ [17, 24] \end{cases} & x_{21} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11}, x_{10} - x_{11}] \\ [14, 2] \end{cases} & x_{30} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{20} - x_{21} - 14, x_{20} - x_{21} - 14] \\ [2, 8] \end{cases} & x_{31} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0, 0.5 \cdot (0.5 \cdot x_{20} - 1.5 \cdot x_{21} - 8) + 0.5] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} & x_{41} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{31}, x_{31}] \\ \Rightarrow \\ [0, -0.25 \cdot x_{20} - 0.75 \cdot x_{21} - 3.5] \\ \Rightarrow \end{cases} & [0, -0.25 \cdot x_{10} + 1.5 \cdot x_{11} - 3.5] \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_{00} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00}, x_{00}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} & x_{01} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{01}, x_{01}] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} \\ x_{10} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00} + x_{01} + 4, x_{00} + x_{01} + 4] \\ [4, 6] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3, 0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3] \\ [3, 4] \end{cases} \\ x_{20} \mapsto \begin{cases} [2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}, 2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}] \\ [17, 24] \end{cases} & x_{21} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11}, x_{10} - x_{11}] \\ [1, 2] \end{cases} \\ x_{30} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{20} - x_{21} - 14, x_{20} - x_{21} - 14] \\ [2, 8] \end{cases} & x_{31} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0, 0.5 \cdot (0.5 \cdot x_{20} - 1.5 \cdot x_{21} - 8) + 0.5] \\ [0, 1] \end{cases} \\ x_{41} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{31}, x_{31}] \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \\ [0, -0.25 \cdot x_{10} + 1.5 \cdot x_{11} - 3.5] \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \\ \end{cases} \\ & \vdots \\ \begin{bmatrix} [0, 0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01}] \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{split} x_{00} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00}, x_{00}] \\ [\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}] \end{cases} & x_{01} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{01}, x_{01}] \\ [\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}] \end{cases} \\ x_{10} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{00} + x_{01} + 4, x_{00} + x_{01} + 4] \\ [\mathbf{4}, \mathbf{6}] \end{cases} & x_{11} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3, 0.5 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01} + 3] \\ [\mathbf{3}, \mathbf{4}] \end{cases} \\ x_{20} \mapsto \begin{cases} [2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}, 2 \cdot x_{10} + 3 \cdot x_{11}] \\ [\mathbf{17}, \mathbf{24}] \end{cases} & x_{21} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{10} - x_{11}, x_{10} - x_{11}] \\ [\mathbf{1}, \mathbf{2}] \end{cases} \\ x_{30} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{20} - x_{21} - 14, x_{20} - x_{21} - 14] \\ [\mathbf{2}, \mathbf{8}] \end{cases} & x_{31} \mapsto \begin{cases} [0, 0.5 \cdot (0.5 \cdot x_{20} - 1.5 \cdot x_{21} - 8) + 0.5] \\ [\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}] \end{cases} \\ x_{41} \mapsto \begin{cases} [x_{31}, x_{31}] \\ \Rightarrow \begin{cases} [0, -0.25 \cdot x_{20} - 0.75 \cdot x_{21} - 3.5] \\ \Rightarrow \end{cases} \\ [0, -0.25 \cdot x_{00} + 0.5 \cdot x_{01}] \\ [\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}] \end{cases} \end{split}$$



Reading Assignment

Efficient Formal Safety Analysis of Neural Networks


Shiqi Wang, Kexin Pei, Justin Whitehouse, Junfeng Yang, Suman Jana Columbia University, NYC, NY 10027, USA {tcwangshiqi, kpei, jaw2228, junfeng, suman}@cs.columbia.edu

Abstract

Neural networks are increasingly deployed in real-world safety-critical domains such as autonomous driving, aircraft collision avoidance, and malware detection. However, these networks have been shown to often mispredict on inputs with minor adversarial or even accidental perturbations. Consequences of such errors can be disastrous and even potentially fatal as shown by the recent Tesla autopilot crashes. Thus, there is an urgent need for formal analysis systems that can rigorously check neural networks for violations of different safety properties such as robustness against adversarial perturbations within a certain L-norm of a given image. An effective safety analysis system for a neural network must be able to either ensure that a safety property is satisfied by the network or find a counterexample, i.e., an input for which the network will violate the property. Unfortunately, most existing techniques for performing such analysis struggle to scale beyond very small networks and the ones that can scale to larger networks suffer from high false positives and cannot produce concrete counterexamples in case of a property violation. In this paper, we present a new efficient approach for rigorously checking different safety properties of neural networks that significantly outperforms existing approaches by multiple orders of magnitude. Our approach can check different safety properties and find concrete counterexamples for networks that are $10 \times$ larger than the ones supported by existing analysis techniques. We believe that our approach to estimating tight output bounds of a network for a given input range can also help improve the explainability of neural networks and guide the training process of more robust neural networks.

1 Introduction

Over the last few years, significant advances in neural networks have resulted in their increasing deployments in critical domains including healthcare, autonomous vehicles, and security. However, recent work has shown that neural networks, despite their tremendous success, often make dangerous mistakes, especially for rare corner case inputs. For example, most state-of-the-art neural networks have been shown to produce incorrect outputs for adversarial inputs specifically crafted by adding minor human-imperceptible perturbations to regular inputs [36, 14]. Similarly, seemingly minor changes in lighting or orientation of an input image have been shown to cause drastic mispredictions by the state-of-the-art neural networks [29, 30, 37]. Such mistakes can have disastrous and even potentially fatal consequences. For example, a Tesla car in autopilot mode recently caused a fatal







Goal G3 in [Kurd03]


Safety

Goal G4 in [Kurd03]















ACAS XU [Julian16][Katz17]

Airborne Collision Avoidance System for Unmanned Aircraft implemented using **45 feed-forward fully-connected ReLU networks**



5 0 -5 COC -5 0 5L WL WL -5 0 5 10 15

5 input **sensor measurements**


- ρ : distance from ownship to intruder
- θ : angle to intruder relative to ownship heading direction
- ψ : heading angle to intruder relative to ownship heading direction
- v_{own}: speed of ownship
- *v_{int}*: speed of intruder

5 output horizontal advisories

- Strong Left
- Weak Left
- Clear of Conflict
- Weak Right
- Strong Right

ACAS Xu Properties [Katz17]

Example: "if intruder is near and approaching from the left, go Strong Right"





Input-Output Properties

- I: input specification
- O: output specification


$$\mathcal{S}_{\mathbf{O}}^{\mathbf{I}} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \{\llbracket M \rrbracket \in \mathscr{P}(\Sigma^*) \mid \mathsf{SAFE}_{\mathbf{O}}^{\mathbf{I}}(\llbracket M \rrbracket)\}$$

 $\mathscr{S}^{\mathbf{I}}_{\mathbf{O}}$ is the set of all neural networks M (or, rather, their semantics [[M]]) that **satisfy** the input and output specification **I** and **O** SAFE_{\mathbf{O}}^{\mathbf{I}}([[M]]) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \forall t \in [[M]]: t_0 \models \mathbf{I} \Rightarrow t_{\omega} \models \mathbf{O}




Numerical Abstractions

Forward Analysis





 proceed forwards from an abstraction of the input specification I


Example





Example






























DeepPoly with Symbolic Constant Propagation










Reading Assignment



Hoang-Dung Tran¹, Diago Manzanas Lopez¹, Patrick Musau¹, Xiaodong Yang¹, Luan Viet Nguyen², Weiming Xiang¹, and Taylor T. Johnson¹

¹ Institute for Software Integrated Systems, Vanderbilt University, TN, USA
² Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA

Abstract. This paper proposes novel reachability algorithms for both exact (sound and complete) and over-approximation (sound) analysis for deep neural networks (DNNs). The approach uses star sets as a symbolic representation of sets of states, which are known in short as stars and provide an effective representation of high-dimensional polytopes. Our star-based reachability algorithms can be applied to several problems in analyzing the robustness of machine learning methods, such as safety and robustness verification of DNNs. Our star-based reachability algorithms are implemented in a software prototype called the neural network verification (NNV) tool that is publicly available for evaluation and comparison. Our experiments show that when verifying ACAS Xu neural networks on a multi-core platform, our exact reachability algorithm is on average about 19 times faster than Reluplex, a satisfiability modulo theory (SMT)-based approach. Furthermore, our approach can visualize the precise behavior of DNNs because the reachable states are computed in the method. Notably, in the case that a DNN violates a safety property, the exact reachability algorithm can construct a complete set of counterexamples. Our star-based over-approximate reachability algorithm is on average 118 times faster than Reluplex on the verification of properties for ACAS Xu networks, even without exploiting the parallelism that comes naturally in our method. Additionally, our over-approximate reachability is much less conservative than DeepZ and DeepPoly, recent approaches utilizing zonotopes and other abstract domains that fail to verify many properties of ACAS Xu networks due to their conservativeness. Moreover, our star-based over-approximate reachability algorithm obtains better robustness bounds in comparison with DeepZ and Deep-Poly when verifying the robustness of image classification DNNs.


1 Introduction

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become one of the most powerful techniques to deal with challenging and complex problems such as image processing [15]

Course 10




Goal G3 in [Kurd03]












Course 10




Course 10



Dependency Fairness [Galhotra17]

The classification is independent of the values of the sensitive inputs



Dependency Fairness


 $\mathscr{F}_{i} \stackrel{{\rm def}}{=} \{\llbracket M \rrbracket \in \mathscr{P}(\Sigma^{*}) \mid \mathsf{UNUSED}_{i}(\llbracket M \rrbracket)\}$


 \mathcal{F}_i is the set of all neural networks M (or, rather, their semantics [[M]]) that **do not use** the value of the sensitive input node $x_{0,i}$ for classification


$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{UNUSED}_i(\llbracket M \rrbracket) \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \forall t \in \llbracket M \rrbracket, v \in \mathscr{R} \colon t_0(x_{0,i}) \neq v \Rightarrow \exists t' \in \llbracket M \rrbracket : \\ (\forall 0 \leq j \leq |L_0| \colon j \neq i \Rightarrow t_0(x_{0,j}) = t'_0(x_{0,j})) \\ \wedge t'_0(x_{0,i}) = v \\ \wedge \max_j t_\omega(x_{N,j}) = \max_j t'_\omega(x_{N,j}) \end{aligned}$$

Intuitively: any possible classification outcome is possible from any value of the sensitive input node $x_{0,i}$

Dependency Fairness







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Dependency Fairness

 $\mathcal{F}_i \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \{\llbracket M \rrbracket \in \mathscr{P}(\Sigma^*) \mid \mathsf{UNUSED}_i(\llbracket M \rrbracket)\}$


 \mathcal{F}_i is the set of all neural networks M (or, rather, their semantics [[M]]) that **do not use** the value of the sensitive input node $x_{0,i}$ for classification

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{UNUSED}_{i}(\llbracket M \rrbracket) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \forall t \in \llbracket M \rrbracket, v \in \mathscr{R} \colon t_{0}(x_{0,i}) \neq v \Rightarrow \exists t' \in \llbracket M \rrbracket : \\ & (\forall 0 \leq j \leq |L_{0}| : j \neq i \Rightarrow t_{0}(x_{0,j}) = t'_{0}(x_{0,j})) \\ & \wedge t'_{0}(x_{0,i}) = v \\ & \wedge \max_{j} t_{\omega}(x_{N,j}) = \max_{j} t'_{\omega}(x_{N,j}) \end{aligned}$$

Intuitively: any possible classification outcome is possible from any value of the sensitive input node $x_{0,i}$


Theorem

 $M \models \mathcal{F}_i \Leftrightarrow \{\llbracket M \rrbracket\} \subseteq \mathcal{F}_i$




(Another) Hierarchy of Semantics


parallel semantics




(Another) Hierarchy of Semantics

parallel semantics





partitioning a set of traces that satisfies dependency fairness with respect to the **outcome classification** yields sets of traces that also satisfy dependency fairness




$$\mathbb{O} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \{ \sigma \in \Sigma \mid \max_{j} \sigma(x_{N,j}) = i \} \mid 0 \le i \le |L_N| \}$$
 outcomes


_emma

. .

 $M \models \mathcal{F}_i \Leftrightarrow \{ \{ t \in \llbracket M \rrbracket \mid t_\omega \in O \} \mid O \in \mathbb{O} \} \subseteq \mathcal{F}_i$




 $\alpha_{\bullet}(S) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \{ t \in T \mid t_{\omega} \in O \} \mid T \in S \land O \in \mathbb{O} \}$ outcome abstraction



$$\mathbb{O} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \{ \sigma \in \Sigma \mid \max_{j} \sigma(x_{N,j}) = i \} \mid 0 \le i \le |L_N| \}$$
 outcomes

_emma

 $M \models \mathcal{F}_i \Leftrightarrow \{ \{ t \in \llbracket M \rrbracket \mid t_\omega \in O \} \mid O \in \mathbb{O} \} \subseteq \mathcal{F}_i$



 $\alpha_{\bullet}(S) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \{ t \in T \mid t_{\omega} \in O \} \mid T \in S \land O \in \mathbb{O} \}$

outcome abstraction


 $\llbracket M \rrbracket_{\bullet} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \alpha_{\bullet}(\{\llbracket M \rrbracket\}) = \{\{t \in \llbracket M \rrbracket \mid t_{\omega} \in O\} \mid O \in \mathbb{O}\}$


Theorem

 $M \models \mathscr{F}_i \Leftrightarrow \llbracket M \rrbracket_{\bullet} \subseteq \alpha_{\bullet}(\mathscr{F}_i) \Leftrightarrow \llbracket M \rrbracket_{\bullet} \subseteq \mathscr{F}_i$


(Another) Hierarchy of Semantics


parallel semantics







to reason about dependency fairness we do not need to consider all intermediate computations between the initial and final states of a trace





 $\alpha_{\sim}(S) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \{ \langle t_0, t_{\omega} \rangle \in \Sigma \times \Sigma \mid t \in T \} \mid T \in S \} \text{ dependency abstraction}$





 $\alpha_{\prec}(S) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \{ \langle t_0, t_{\omega} \rangle \in \Sigma \times \Sigma \mid t \in T \} \mid T \in S \} \text{ dependency abstraction}$

 $\llbracket M \rrbracket_{\sim} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \alpha_{\sim}(\llbracket M \rrbracket_{\bullet}) = \{\{\langle t_0, t_\omega \rangle \in \Sigma \times \Sigma \mid t \in \llbracket M \rrbracket \land t_\omega \in O\} \mid O \in \mathbb{O}\}$

Theorem

 $M \models \mathscr{F}_i \Leftrightarrow \llbracket M \rrbracket_{\prec} \subseteq_{\prec} \alpha_{\prec}(\alpha_{\bullet}(\mathscr{F}_i)) \Leftrightarrow \llbracket M \rrbracket_{\prec} \subseteq_{\prec} \alpha_{\prec}(\mathscr{F}_i)$

partitioning with respect to the outcome classification **induces a partition of the** space of **values** of the input nodes **used** for classification

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Course 10

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Static Analysis of Neural Networks

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
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 $\alpha_{\prec}(S) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \{ \langle t_0, t_{\omega} \rangle \in \Sigma \times \Sigma \mid t \in T \} \mid T \in S \} \text{ dependency abstraction}$

 $\llbracket M \rrbracket_{\sim} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \alpha_{\sim}(\llbracket M \rrbracket_{\bullet}) = \{\{\langle t_0, t_\omega \rangle \in \Sigma \times \Sigma \mid t \in \llbracket M \rrbracket \land t_\omega \in O\} \mid O \in \mathbb{O}\}$

Theorem

$$M \models \mathscr{F}_i \Leftrightarrow \llbracket M \rrbracket_{\prec} \subseteq_{\prec} \alpha_{\prec}(\alpha_{\bullet}(\mathscr{F}_i)) \Leftrightarrow \llbracket M \rrbracket_{\prec} \subseteq_{\prec} \alpha_{\prec}(\mathscr{F}_i)$$


Lemma

 $M \models \mathscr{F}_i \Leftrightarrow \forall A, B \in \llbracket M \rrbracket_{\prec} \colon (A_{\omega} \neq B_{\omega} \Rightarrow A_0 |_{\neq i} \cap B_0 |_{\neq i} = \emptyset)$

Naïve Abstraction


Naïve Backward Analysis

(2) forget the values of the sensitive input nodes






Naïve Backward Analysis




Back to the Semantics...


(Another) Hierarchy of Semantics


parallel semantics






partitioning a set of traces that satisfies dependency fairness with respect to the non-sensitive inputs yields sets of traces that also satisfy dependency fairness






 $\alpha_{\mathbb{I}}(S) \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \{ \{ \langle t_0, t_\omega \rangle \in R \mid t_0 \in I \} \mid R \in S \land I \in \mathbb{I} \}$

parallel abstraction





 $\alpha_{\mathbb{I}}(S) \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} \{ \{ \langle t_0, t_{\omega} \rangle \in R \mid t_0 \in I \} \mid R \in S \land I \in \mathbb{I} \}$

parallel abstraction

$$\{ [M] \}_{\sim}^{\mathbb{I}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \alpha_{\mathbb{I}}(\llbracket M \rrbracket_{\sim}) = \{ \{ \langle t_0, t_{\omega} \rangle \in \Sigma \times \Sigma \mid t \in \llbracket M \rrbracket \land t_0 \in I \land t_{\omega} \in O \} \mid I \in \llbracket \land O \in \mathbb{O} \}$$

Theorem


$$M \models \mathscr{F}_i \Leftrightarrow \{[M]\}_{\prec}^{\mathbb{I}} \subseteq_{\mathbb{I}} \alpha_{\mathbb{I}}(\alpha_{\prec}(\alpha_{\bullet}(\mathscr{F}_i))) \Leftrightarrow \llbracket M \rrbracket_{\prec} \subseteq_{\prec} \alpha_{\mathbb{I}}(\alpha_{\prec}(\mathscr{F}_i))$$

Lemma


 $M \models \mathscr{F}_i \Leftrightarrow \forall I \in \mathbb{I} \colon \forall A, B \in \{[M]\}_{\sim}^{\mathbb{I}} \colon (A_{\omega}^I \neq B_{\omega}^I \Rightarrow A_0^I|_{\neq i} \cap B_0^I|_{\neq i} = \emptyset)$


Better Abstraction


1 partition the space of values of the **non-sensitive input** nodes





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







































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ß	.gitignore	RQ1 reproducibility	4 months ago	# static-analysis # machine-learning
	LICENSE	Initial prototype	2 years ago	#neural-networks #fairnes
ß	README.md	RQ5 and RQ6 reproducibility	4 months ago	🛱 Readme
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Course 10

Static Analysis of Neural Networks

decision-making in our social, economic, and civic lives.

Nowadays, machine-learned software plays an increasingly important role in critical

Internship Opportunities

Inference of Implicit Assumptions on Input Data

Fairness of Decision Tree Ensembles

Static Analysis of Neural Network Training

Static Analysis of Medical Data-Processing Software

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