

# Introduction

MPRI 2–6: Abstract Interpretation,  
application to verification and static analysis

Antoine Miné

year 2013–2014

course 01-A

20 September 2013

# Ariane 5, Flight 501



Maiden flight of the Ariane 5 Launcher, 4 June 1996.

# Ariane 5, Flight 501



40s after launch...

# Ariane 5, Flight 501

- **Cause:** software error<sup>1</sup>

- arithmetic overflow in unprotected data conversion from 64-bit float to 16-bit integer types<sup>2</sup>

```
P_M_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BH) :=  
    UC_16S_EN_16NS (TDB.T_ENTIER_16S  
        ((1.0/C_M_LSB_BH) * G_M_INFO_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BH)));
```

- software exception not caught  $\implies$  computer switched off
- all backup computers run the same software  
all computers switched off, no guidance  
 $\implies$  rocket self-destructs

- **Cost:** estimated at more than 370 000 000 US\$<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> J.-L. Lions et al., Ariane 501 Inquiry Board report.

<sup>2</sup> J.-J. Levy. Un petit bogue, un grand boum. Séminaire du Département d'informatique de l'ENS, 2010.

<sup>3</sup> M. Dowson. "The Ariane 5 Software Failure". Software Engineering Notes 22 (2): 84, March 1997.

# How can we avoid such failures?

- Choose a safe programming language.  
C (low level) / Ada, Java (high level)
- Carefully design the software.  
many software development methods exist
- Program well.  
is it art or science?
- Test the software extensively.

# How can we avoid such failures?

- Choose a safe programming language.  
C (low level) / Ada, Java (high level)  
yet, Ariane 5 software is written in Ada
- Carefully design the software.  
many software development methods exist  
yet, critical embedded software follow strict development processes
- Program well.  
is it art or science?
- Test the software extensively.  
yet, the erroneous code was well tested... on Ariane 4!  
  
⇒ **not sufficient!**

# How can we avoid such failures?

- Choose a safe programming language.  
C (low level) / Ada, Java (high level)  
yet, Ariane 5 software is written in Ada
- Carefully design the software.  
many software development methods exist  
yet, critical embedded software follow strict development processes
- Program well.  
is it art or science?
- Test the software extensively.  
yet, the erroneous code was well tested... on Ariane 4!  
  
⇒ **not sufficient!**

We should use **formal methods**.

provide rigorous, mathematical insurance

# Invariants and programs

```
assume X in [0,1000];
```

```
I := 0;
```

```
while I < X do
```

```
    I := I + 2;
```

```
assert I in [0,???
```

---

<sup>4</sup>R. W. Floyd. "Assigning meanings to programs". In Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. Symposia in Applied Mathematics, vol. 19, pp. 19–31, 1967.



# Invariants and programs

```
assume X in [0,1000];
```

```
I := 0;
```

```
while I < X do
```

```
    I := I + 2;
```

```
assert I in [0,1000]
```

---

<sup>4</sup>R. W. Floyd. "Assigning meanings to programs". In Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. Symposia in Applied Mathematics, vol. 19, pp. 19–31, 1967.

# Invariants and programs

```
assume X in [0,1000];  
{X ∈ [0,1000]}  
I := 0;  
{X ∈ [0,1000], I = 0}  
while I < X do  
  {X ∈ [0,1000], I ∈ [0,998]}  
  I := I + 2;  
  {X ∈ [0,1000], I ∈ [2,1000]}  
{X ∈ [0,1000], I ∈ [0,1000]}  
assert I in [0,1000]
```



Robert Floyd<sup>4</sup>

**invariant:** property true of all the executions of the program

---

<sup>4</sup>R. W. Floyd. "Assigning meanings to programs". In Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. Symposia in Applied Mathematics, vol. 19, pp. 19–31, 1967.

# Invariants and programs

```
assume X in [0,1000];  
{X ∈ [0,1000]}  
I := 0;  
{X ∈ [0,1000], I = 0}  
while I < X do  
  {X ∈ [0,1000], I ∈ {0, 2, ..., 996, 998}}  
  I := I + 2;  
  {X ∈ [0,1000], I ∈ {2, 4, ..., 998, 1000}}  
{X ∈ [0,1000], I ∈ {0, 2, ..., 998, 1000}}  
assert I in [0,1000]
```



Robert Floyd<sup>4</sup>

**inductive invariant:** invariant that can be proved to hold by induction on loop iterates

---

<sup>4</sup>R. W. Floyd. "Assigning meanings to programs". In Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. Symposia in Applied Mathematics, vol. 19, pp. 19–31, 1967.

$$\frac{}{\{P[e/X]\} X := e \{P\}} \quad \frac{\{P\} C_1 \{R\} \quad \{R\} C_2 \{Q\}}{\{P\} C_1; C_2 \{Q\}}$$

$$\frac{\{P \& b\} C \{P\}}{\{P\} \text{while } b \text{ do } C \{P \& \neg b\}}$$

...



Tony Hoare<sup>5</sup>

- sound logic to prove program properties, (rel.) complete
- proofs can be checked automatically  
(e.g., using proof assistants: Coq, PVS, Isabelle, HOL, etc.)

---

<sup>5</sup>C. A. R. Hoare. "An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming". *Commun. ACM* 12(10): 576-580 (1969).

<sup>6</sup>How Many Lines of Code in Windows?". *Knowing.NET*. December 6, 2005.

$$\frac{}{\{P[e/X]\} X := e \{P\}} \quad \frac{\{P\} C_1 \{R\} \quad \{R\} C_2 \{Q\}}{\{P\} C_1; C_2 \{Q\}}$$

$$\frac{\{P \& b\} C \{P\}}{\{P\} \text{while } b \text{ do } C \{P \& \neg b\}}$$

...



Tony Hoare<sup>5</sup>

- sound logic to prove program properties, (rel.) complete
- proofs can be checked automatically  
(e.g., using proof assistants: Coq, PVS, Isabelle, HOL, etc.)
- requires annotations  
but **manual annotation is not practical for large programs!**  
(e.g., Windows XP: 45 Mlines<sup>6</sup>)

<sup>5</sup>C. A. R. Hoare. "An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming". *Commun. ACM* 12(10): 576-580 (1969).

<sup>6</sup>How Many Lines of Code in Windows?. *Knowing.NET*. December 6, 2005.

# Computers, programs, data

$$O(P, D) \in \{\text{yes}, \text{no}, \perp\}$$



*O*



*P*



*D*

The computer *O* runs the program *P* on the data *D* and answers (*yes*, *no*)... or does not answer ( $\perp$ ).

# Computers, programs, data

$$O(P, D) \in \{\text{yes}, \text{no}, \perp\}$$



$O$



$P$



$P'$

Note that programs are also a kind of data!  
They can be fed to other programs. (e.g., to compilers)

Static analyzer  $A$ .

Given a program  $P$ :

- $O(A, P) = \text{yes} \iff \forall D, O(P, D)$  is safe
- $O(A, P) \neq \perp$  (the static analysis always terminates)



# Static analysis

Static analyzer  $A$ .

Given a program  $P$ :

- $O(A, P) = \text{yes} \iff \forall D, O(P, D)$  is safe
- $O(A, P) \neq \perp$  (the static analysis always terminates)

$\implies P$  is proved safe even before it is run!



# Fundamental undecidability

There **cannot exist** a static analyzer  $A$  proving the termination of every terminating program  $P$ .



Alan Turing<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> A. M. Turing. "Computability and definability". The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 2, pp. 153–163, (1937).

<sup>8</sup> H. G. Rice. "Classes of Recursively Enumerable Sets and Their Decision Problems." Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 74, 358-366, 1953.

# Fundamental undecidability

There **cannot exist** a static analyzer  $A$  proving the termination of every terminating program  $P$ .

Proof sketch:

$$A(P \cdot D) : O(A, P \cdot D) = \begin{cases} \text{yes if } O(P, D) \neq \perp \\ \text{no otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$A'(X) : \text{while } A(X \cdot X) \text{ do nothing; no}$

do we have  $O(A', A') = \perp$  or  $\neq \perp$ ? neither!  
 $\implies A$  cannot exist



Alan Turing<sup>7</sup>

All “interesting” properties are **undecidable!**<sup>8</sup>



---

<sup>7</sup> A. M. Turing. "Computability and definability". The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 2, pp. 153–163, (1937).

<sup>8</sup> H. G. Rice. "Classes of Recursively Enumerable Sets and Their Decision Problems." Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 74, 358-366, 1953.

# Approximate static analysis

An **approximate** static analyzer  $A$  always answers in finite time ( $\neq \perp$ ):

- either **yes**: the program  $P$  is definitely safe (soundness)
- either **no**: I don't know (incompleteness)

Sufficient to prove the safety of (some) programs.  
Fails on infinitely many programs. . .

# Approximate static analysis

An **approximate** static analyzer  $A$  always answers in finite time ( $\neq \perp$ ):

- either **yes**: the program  $P$  is definitely safe (soundness)
- either **no**: I don't know (incompleteness)

Sufficient to prove the safety of (some) programs.  
Fails on infinitely many programs...


$\implies$  We should **adapt** the analyzer  $A$  to

- a class of programs to verify, and
- a class of safety properties to check.

# Abstract interpretation



Patrick Cousot<sup>9</sup>



General theory of the approximation and comparison of program semantics:

- unifies many semantics
- allows the definition of static analyses that are correct by construction

<sup>9</sup> P. Cousot. "Méthodes itératives de construction et d'approximation de points fixes d'opérateurs monotones sur un treillis, analyse sémantique des programmes." Thèse És Sciences Mathématiques, 1978.

# Abstract interpretation

$(\mathcal{S}_0)$

assume X in [0,1000];

$(\mathcal{S}_1)$

I := 0;

$(\mathcal{S}_2)$

while  $(\mathcal{S}_3)$  I < X do

$(\mathcal{S}_4)$

I := I + 2;

$(\mathcal{S}_5)$

$(\mathcal{S}_6)$

program

# Abstract interpretation

$(\mathcal{S}_0)$

assume  $X$  in  $[0,1000]$ ;

$(\mathcal{S}_1)$

$I := 0$ ;

$(\mathcal{S}_2)$

while  $(\mathcal{S}_3)$   $I < X$  do

$(\mathcal{S}_4)$

$I := I + 2$ ;

$(\mathcal{S}_5)$

$(\mathcal{S}_6)$

program

$\mathcal{S}_i \in \mathcal{D} = \mathcal{P}(\{I, X\} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z})$

$\mathcal{S}_0 = \{(i, x) \mid i, x \in \mathbb{Z}\} = \top$

$\mathcal{S}_1 = \{(i, x) \in \mathcal{S}_0 \mid x \in [0, 1000]\} = F_1(\mathcal{S}_0)$

$\mathcal{S}_2 = \{(0, x) \mid \exists i, (i, x) \in \mathcal{S}_1\} = F_2(\mathcal{S}_1)$

$\mathcal{S}_3 = \mathcal{S}_2 \cup \mathcal{S}_5$

$\mathcal{S}_4 = \{(i, x) \in \mathcal{S}_3 \mid i < x\} = F_4(\mathcal{S}_3)$

$\mathcal{S}_5 = \{(i + 2, x) \mid (i, x) \in \mathcal{S}_4\} = F_5(\mathcal{S}_4)$

$\mathcal{S}_6 = \{(i, x) \in \mathcal{S}_3 \mid i \geq x\} = F_6(\mathcal{S}_3)$

semantics

**Concrete** semantics  $\mathcal{S}_i \in \mathcal{D} = \mathcal{P}(\{I, X\} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z})$ :

- smallest solution of a system of equations
- strongest invariant (and an inductive invariant)
- not computable in general



# Abstract interpretation

$(S_0)$

assume X in [0,1000];

$(S_1)$

I := 0;

$(S_2)$

while  $(S_3)$  I < X do

$(S_4)$

I := I + 2;

$(S_5)$

$(S_6)$

program

$S_i^\# \in \mathcal{D}^\#$

$S_0^\# = \top^\#$

$S_1^\# = F_1^\#(S_0^\#)$

$S_2^\# = F_2^\#(S_1^\#)$

$S_3^\# = S_2^\# \cup^\# S_5^\#$

$S_4^\# = F_4^\#(S_3^\#)$

$S_5^\# = F_5^\#(S_4^\#)$


$S_6^\# = F_6^\#(S_3^\#)$

semantics

**Abstract** semantics  $S_i^\# \in \mathcal{D}^\#$ :

- $\mathcal{D}^\#$  subset of properties of interest  
(with a machine representation)
- $F^\# : \mathcal{D}^\# \rightarrow \mathcal{D}^\#$  over-approximates the effect of  $F : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}$  in  $\mathcal{D}^\#$   
(with effective algorithms)


# Numeric abstract domain examples



concrete sets  $\mathcal{D}$ :


$\{(0, 3), (5.5, 0), (12, 7), \dots\}$

# Numeric abstract domain examples



concrete sets  $\mathcal{D}$ :  $\{(0, 3), (5.5, 0), (12, 7), \dots\}$   
abstract polyhedra  $\mathcal{D}_p^\sharp$ :  $6X + 11Y \geq 33 \wedge \dots$

# Numeric abstract domain examples



concrete sets  $\mathcal{D}$ :

$$\{(0, 3), (5.5, 0), (12, 7), \dots\}$$


abstract polyhedra  $\mathcal{D}_p^\#$ :

$$6X + 11Y \geq 33 \wedge \dots$$

abstract octagons  $\mathcal{D}_o^\#$ :

$$X + Y \geq 3 \wedge Y \geq 0 \wedge \dots$$

# Numeric abstract domain examples



concrete sets  $\mathcal{D}$ :

$$\{(0, 3), (5.5, 0), (12, 7), \dots\}$$

abstract polyhedra  $\mathcal{D}_p^\#$ :

$$6X + 11Y \geq 33 \wedge \dots$$


abstract octagons  $\mathcal{D}_o^\#$ :

$$X + Y \geq 3 \wedge Y \geq 0 \wedge \dots$$

abstract intervals  $\mathcal{D}_i^\#$ :

$$X \in [0, 12] \wedge Y \in [0, 8]$$

# Numeric abstract domain examples



concrete sets  $\mathcal{D}$ :

abstract polyhedra  $\mathcal{D}_p^\#$ :

abstract octagons  $\mathcal{D}_o^\#$ :

abstract intervals  $\mathcal{D}_i^\#$ :

$\{(0, 3), (5.5, 0), (12, 7), \dots\}$

$6X + 11Y \geq 33 \wedge \dots$


$X + Y \geq 3 \wedge Y \geq 0 \wedge \dots$

$X \in [0, 12] \wedge Y \in [0, 8]$

not computable  
exponential cost  
cubic cost  
linear cost


Trade-off between cost and expressiveness / precision

# Correctness proof and false alarms



The program is **correct** ( $\text{blue} \cap \text{red} = \emptyset$ ).

## Correctness proof and false alarms




The program is **correct** ( $\text{blue} \cap \text{red} = \emptyset$ ).

The polyhedra domain **can prove the correctness** ( $\text{cyan} \cap \text{red} = \emptyset$ ).



# Correctness proof and false alarms




The program is **correct** ( $\text{blue} \cap \text{red} = \emptyset$ ).

The polyhedra domain **can prove the correctness** ( $\text{cyan} \cap \text{red} = \emptyset$ ).

The interval domain **cannot** ( $\text{green} \cap \text{red} \neq \emptyset$ , false alarm).

## Numeric abstract domain examples (cont.)



abstract semantics  $F^\sharp$  in the interval domain  $\mathcal{D}_i^\sharp$

- $\mathbf{I} := \mathbf{I} + 2$ :  $(\mathbf{I} \in [l, h]) \mapsto (\mathbf{I} \in [l+2, h+2])$
- $\mathbf{U}^\sharp$ :  $(\mathbf{I} \in [l_1, h_1]) \cup^\sharp (\mathbf{I} \in [l_2, h_2])$   
 $= (\mathbf{I} \in [\min(l_1, l_2), \max(h_1, h_2)])$
- ...

$$(\mathcal{D}, \subseteq) \begin{matrix} \xleftarrow{\gamma} \\ \xrightarrow{\alpha} \end{matrix} (\mathcal{D}^\#, \subseteq^\#)$$

$$\alpha(X) \subseteq^\# Y^\# \iff X \subseteq \gamma(Y^\#)$$



Évariste Galois

Use:

- $\alpha(X)$  is the best abstraction of  $X$  in  $\mathcal{D}^\#$
- $F^\# = \alpha \circ F \circ \gamma$  is the best abstraction of  $F$  in  $\mathcal{D}^\# \rightarrow \mathcal{D}^\#$

$$(\mathcal{D}, \subseteq) \xleftrightarrow[\alpha]{\gamma} (\mathcal{D}^\#, \subseteq^\#)$$

$$\alpha(X) \subseteq^\# Y^\# \iff X \subseteq \gamma(Y^\#)$$



Évariste Galois

## Use:

- $\alpha(X)$  is the best abstraction of  $X$  in  $\mathcal{D}^\#$
- $F^\# = \alpha \circ F \circ \gamma$  is the best abstraction of  $F$  in  $\mathcal{D}^\# \rightarrow \mathcal{D}^\#$

## Example: in the interval domain $\mathcal{D}_i^\#$

- $[l_1, h_1] \subseteq_i^\# [l_2, h_2] \iff l_1 \geq l_2 \wedge h_1 \leq h_2$
- $\gamma_i([l, h]) = \{x \in \mathbb{Z} \mid l \leq x \leq h\}$
- $\alpha_i(X) = [\min X, \max X]$

# Resolution by iteration and extrapolation

Challenge: the equation system is recursive:  $\vec{S}^\sharp = \vec{F}^\sharp(\vec{S}^\sharp)$ .

Solution: resolution by iteration:  $\vec{S}^{\sharp 0} = \emptyset^\sharp$ ,  $\vec{S}^{\sharp i+1} = \vec{F}^\sharp(\vec{S}^{\sharp i})$ .

e.g.,  $\mathcal{S}_3^\sharp$ :  $I \in \emptyset$ ,  $I = 0$ ,  $I \in [0, 2]$ ,  $I \in [0, 4]$ ,  $\dots$ ,  $I \in [0, 1000]$

# Resolution by iteration and extrapolation

Challenge: the equation system is recursive:  $\vec{S}^\# = \vec{F}^\#(\vec{S}^\#)$ .

Solution: resolution by iteration:  $\vec{S}^{\#0} = \emptyset^\#, \vec{S}^{\#i+1} = \vec{F}^\#(\vec{S}^{\#i})$ .

e.g.,  $\mathcal{S}_3^\# : I \in \emptyset, I = 0, I \in [0, 2], I \in [0, 4], \dots, I \in [0, 1000]$

Challenge: infinite or very long sequence of iterates in  $\mathcal{D}^\#$

Solution: extrapolation operator  $\nabla$

e.g.,  $[0, 2] \nabla [0, 4] = [0, +\infty[$

- remove unstable bounds and constraints
- ensures the convergence in finite time
- **inductive** reasoning (through generalisation)

# Resolution by iteration and extrapolation

Challenge: the equation system is recursive:  $\vec{S}^\# = \vec{F}^\#(\vec{S}^\#)$ .

Solution: resolution by iteration:  $\vec{S}^{\#0} = \emptyset^\#, \vec{S}^{\#i+1} = \vec{F}^\#(\vec{S}^{\#i})$ .

e.g.,  $\mathcal{S}_3^\# : I \in \emptyset, I = 0, I \in [0, 2], I \in [0, 4], \dots, I \in [0, 1000]$

Challenge: infinite or very long sequence of iterates in  $\mathcal{D}^\#$

Solution: extrapolation operator  $\nabla$

e.g.,  $[0, 2] \nabla [0, 4] = [0, +\infty[$

- remove unstable bounds and constraints
- ensures the convergence in finite time
- **inductive** reasoning (through generalisation)

$\implies$  effective solving method  $\longrightarrow$  static analyzer!

## Other uses of abstract interpretation

- Analysis of dynamic memory data-structures (*shape analysis*).
- Analysis of parallel, distributed, and multi-thread programs.
- Analysis of probabilistic programs.
- Analysis of biological systems.
- Security analysis (*information flow*).
- Termination analysis.
- Cost analysis.
- Analyses to enable compiler optimisations.
- ...



# The Astrée static analyzer

The screenshot displays the Astrée static analyzer interface. The main window is titled "Astrée" and shows the analysis of a file named "scenarios.c". The interface is divided into several panes:

- Left Pane:** Contains a navigation tree with sections like "Example 1: scenarios", "Local settings", "Analysis options", and "Files".
- Top Pane:** Shows the "Analyzed file: /invalid/path/scenarios.c" and the "Original source: C:/Pr...ples/scenarios/src/scenarios.c".
- Code Editor:** Displays C code with annotations. Line 36 is highlighted: `ArrayBlock[15] = 0x15;`. Line 49 is also highlighted: `ArrayBlock[15] = 0x15; // easy case`. Other lines include pointer declarations, conditional checks for uninitialized variables, and an assertion: `ASTREE_assert((-2 <= z && z <= 2));`.
- Bottom Pane:** Shows a summary of analysis results. It includes a table with columns for "Errors", "Alarms", "Not analyzed", "Coverage", and "Files".

Errors	Alarms	Not analyzed	Coverage	Files
2 (2)	5 (5)	0	100%	scenarios.c

Below the table, a tree view shows the following categories:

- Alarms
  - Overflow in conversion
  - Out-of-bound array access
  - Possible overflow upon dereference
  - Possible overflow upon dereference
  - Assertion failure
- Errors
  - Define runtime error during assignment in this context. Analysis stopped for this context.
  - Define runtime error during assignment in this context. Analysis stopped for this context.

At the bottom left, a status bar shows: "Errors: 2 (2)", "Alarms: 5 (5)", "Warnings: 1", "Coverage: 100%", "Duration: 30s". A traffic light icon is visible next to these statistics.

At the bottom of the window, it says: "Connected to localhost:1059 as anonymous@ABSINT-VMWARE".

# The Astrée static analyzer

**Analyseur statique de programmes temps-réels embarqués**  
(static analyzer for real-time embedded software)

- developed at **ENS** (since 2001)
  - | B. Blanchet, P. Cousot, R. Cousot, J. Feret,  
| L. Mauborgne, D. Monniaux, A. Miné, X. Rival
- industrialized and made commercially available by **AbsInt**  
(since 2009)



Astrée

[www.astree.ens.fr](http://www.astree.ens.fr)



AbsInt

[www.absint.com](http://www.absint.com)

# The Astrée static analyzer

## Specialized:

- for the analysis of **run-time errors**  
(arithmetic overflows, array overflows, divisions by 0, etc.)
- on embedded critical **C** software  
(no dynamic memory allocation, no recursivity)
- in particular on **control / command** software  
(reactive programs, intensive floating-point computations)
- intended for **validation**  
(analysis does not miss any error and tries to minimise false alarms)

# The Astrée static analyzer

## Specialized:

- for the analysis of **run-time errors**  
(arithmetic overflows, array overflows, divisions by 0, etc.)
- on embedded critical **C** software  
(no dynamic memory allocation, no recursivity)
- in particular on **control / command** software  
(reactive programs, intensive floating-point computations)
- intended for **validation**  
(analysis does not miss any error and tries to minimise false alarms)

Approximately **40 abstract domains** are used **at the same time**:

- numeric domains (intervals, octagons, ellipsoids, etc.)
- boolean domains
- domains expressing properties on the history of computations

# Astrée applications (at ENS)



Airbus A340-300 (2003)




Airbus A380 (2004)



(model of) ESA ATV (2008)

- size: from 70 000 to 860 000 lines of C
- analysis time: from 45mn to  $\simeq 40$ h
- alarm(s): 0 (proof of absence of run-time error)


# Fluctuat



Static analysis of the **accuracy of floating-point computations**:

- bound the range of variables
- bound the **rounding errors** wrt. real computation
- track the **origin** of rounding errors  
(which operation contributes to most error,  
target for improvements)
- uses specific abstract domains  
(affine arithmetic, zonotopes)
  
- developed at CEA-LIST (E. Goubault, S. Putot)
- industrial use (Airbus)

# Clousot: CodeContract static checker





## CodeContracts:

- **assertion** language for .NET (C#, VB, etc.)  
(pre-conditions, post-conditions, invariants)
- dynamic checking  
(insert run-time checks)
- **static checking**  
(modular abstract interpretation)
- **automatic inference**  
(abstract interpretation to infer necessary preconditions backwards)
  
- developed at Microsoft Research (M. Fahndrich, F. Logozzo)
- part of .NET Framework 4.0
- integrated to Visual Studio


# Course organization

---

# Course topics

- **foundation** of abstract interpretation
- **numeric** abstract domains  
(non-relational, relational, specific)
- **memory** abstract domains  
(pointers, shape analysis)
- **symbolic** abstract domains  
(trees)
- domain **combiners**  
(reduced products, partitioning)
- analysis of **concurrent** programs
- analysis of **mobile** systems
- analysis of **biological** systems

# Teaching team



Jérôme Feret



Antoine Miné



Xavier Rival



Laurent Mauborgne  
(AbsInt)

Visit regularly:

<http://www.di.ens.fr/~mine/enseignement/mpri/2013-2014/>

- latest information on course dates
- course slides (after the presentation)
- M2 internship proposals (updated regularly)

## Exams:

- written exam on 6 December 2013
- oral exam 7 March 2014  
(read a scientific article, present it, answer questions)